Alternatives to Marx: an overview of models for ideological influence

All art is profoundly influenced, often in ways which are difficult for the artist – or the audience – to realise, by the society in which it is produced. This premise seems uncontroversial, however this paper serves as an overview which seeks to trace a development of models for describing and explaining such a postulated influence, and thereby to arrive at more complex and possibly more sophisticated explanations than those of our starting point – Marx. The nature of the influence examined in this paper is ideological. I broadly define ideology in the following manner, drawing heavily from Althusser: an ideology is a value system motivated by the human need to attach significance to, and promote faith in, our own lives. Furthermore, I distinguish ideology as those value systems which have attained a significant dynamic force: ideology should derive a coercive and normative power though our inclination as social animals towards gaining affirmation by virtue of our belonging to a community in consensus, a community living out "established" truths.

Ideology from the modes of production

In *The Communist Manifesto*, Marx describes the processes of globalisation which he was witnessing in the mid-nineteenth century, and observes the effect that such a force is having upon the manner in which people think. "It compels all nations, on pain

of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image"[1]. With particular reference here to the First Opium War, Marx is describing a manifestation of his claim that "The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class"[2]. With vehemence, Marx accuses his opponents with the invective, "your very ideas are but the outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property"[3].

Marx's economic determinist model would propose a strong link between the base – consisting of the material means of production, distribution and exchange – and the superstructure, which is the "cultural world of ideas, art, religion, law, and so on"[4]. Although Marx enjoyed classical art, and Engels would go as far as to argue that revolutionary art should not be overtly didactic for reasons of taste[5], Marx's position as laid out in *The Communist Manifesto* underscores the significance he ascribes to the material conditions and social relations of one's age: "Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations and in his social life?"[6]. Such an entrenched influence whereby a cultural superstructure is "determined"[7] by the influence which permeates from a material and

[1] Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, ed. Frederic L. Bender, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), p.59
[2] ibid., p.73
[3] id., p.71
[4] Peter Barry, *Beginning Theory: an introduction to literary and cultural theory*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p.158
[5] In a letter to the English novelist Margaret Harkness in April 1888, Engels writes, "The more the opinions of the author remain hidden, the better the work of art". Quoted here from Peter Barry, *Beginning Theory: an introduction to literary and cultural theory*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p.158
[6] Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, ed. Frederic L. Bender, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), p.73
[7] Peter Barry, *Beginning Theory: an introduction to literary and cultural theory*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p.158

economic base, leaves less room for the artist's freedom of imagination than one would like to believe.

The base/superstructure model is admittedly a simplification of Marx's writings, and as Frederic Bender argues, whenever Marx uses the term "modes of production", he is referring to the class antagonisms arising from the manner by which production divides society and distributes wealth, rather than simply to specific technologies of production[8]. Despite these matters, The Economist points to Marx's legacy some one hundred and fifty years after the Manifesto was penned, and whilst crediting him with much, derides the fundamental underpinnings of the base/superstructure model.

> The core idea that economic structure determines everything has been especially pernicious. According to this view, the right to private property, for instance, exists only because it serves bourgeois relations of production, The same can be said for every other right or civil liberty one finds in society. The idea that such rights have a deeper moral underpinning is an illusion. … Never ask what a painter, playwright, architect or philosopher thought he was doing. You know before you even glance at his work what he was *really* doing: shoring up the ruling class. … The result is a withering away not of the state but of opportunities for intelligent conversation and of confidence that young people might receive a decent liberal education.[9]

Ideology as Political Collaboration

Whilst *The Economist* rejects class as an increasingly untenable analytical framework and questions what the ideas of the ruling classes have become, we can observe a situation in Leninist Russia when the ideas of the age generally were those of its ruling class. In 1905, Lenin argued that "Literature must become Party literature … literature must become part of the organized, methodical, and unified labours of the

[8] id., p.28
[9] 'Marx after communism', *The Economist*, December 21st 2002 – January 3rd 2003, Vol. 365, No.8304, p.19

social-democratic party"[10]. This development within nominally communist states thematically foreshadows Althusser's development upon the Marxist model – that of ideological influence via state apparatus. Using the terms "overdeterminism"[11] and "relative autonomy"[12], Althusser argued that a number of interacting causes gives rise to the structure of our systems of meaning, not merely economic causes. Furthermore, artists have a degree of relative autonomy within which to express ideas as distinct from the ideas of the ruling class. Nonetheless, Althusserian theory sees ideology as emanating from the state. Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs) secure our assent and interpellate us as citizens in more thorough ways than sheer material power can. Ideological influence enforces certain assumptions as social norms, and certain beliefs as acceptable truths: "it imposes (without appearing to do so since these are "obviousnesses") obviousnesses as obviousnesses, which we cannot *fail to recognise*"[13].

The effect of Althusser's development of the Marxist model is to alloy economic influences ("the reproduction of the relations of production is to be assured"[14]) with the political structures sustaining them in a manner that is both more willed and more insidiously pervasive. Althusser writes that "ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence"[15] and further argues that we are complicit in such an act since it allows us "the absolute guarantee that everything really is so, and that on condition the subjects recognize what they are and behave

[10] Peter Barry, *Beginning Theory: an introduction to literary and cultural theory*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p.160
[11] id., p.163
[12] id.
[13] Louis Althusser, "'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses"', *Literary Theory: An Anthology*, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1998), p.300
[14] id., p.303
[15] id., p.294

accordingly, everything will be alright: Amen"[16]. It is not only by agreeing to our real conditions of existence as described by the state, but also by agreeing to the imaginary representation of our free acceptance to such subjectification, that we are able to assure ourselves of respectability, correctness and a validity. Such a validity – and the unspoken threat of its withdrawal – ensures that the subject, once interpellated, will work "all by himself"[17]. As Foucault would write of the subject who has internalised discipline, "he becomes the principle of his own subjection"[18].

Ideology as the repressed

Overdeterminism was originally Freud's term for a number of factors underlying a psychological disturbance; and a modulation of this view of politically controlled ideology is suggested by Freud's analysis of the nature of anxiety in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Freud writes of a boy who would dismiss objects with an "'o-o-o-o'"[19] – representative of the German "*fort*" [gone][20] – casting them away from him. Freud's interpretation is that this represents a renarration of the child's own experience of the disconcertingly uncontrollable absences of his mother. Freud links this behaviour to wider observations of children's play: "in their play, children repeat everything that has made a great impression on them in real life, and that in doing so they abreact the strength of the impression and, as one might put it, make themselves the master of the

[16] id., p.302
[17] id., p.303
[18] Michel Foucault, 'Discipline and Punish', *Literary Theory: An Anthology*, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1998), p.471
[19] Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, trans. and ed. by James Strachey, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961), p.8
[20] id., p.9

situation"[21]. Freud uses the pleasure principle to explain how we are driven to release the tension that arises whenever the repressed surfaces. This can result in a "'compulsion to repeat'"[22], to renarrate, and could beneficially acclimatise us to situations of uncertainty – "There is something about anxiety that protects its subject against fright and so against fright-neuroses"[23].

Boym, in her book *The Future of Nostalgia* relates one account of post-communist central Europe which exhibits this seemingly paradoxical yearning after the comfort of the unheimlich, now nostalgically romanticised:

> We have left the gate of an imaginary extermination camp, pinching ourselves in disbelief … The kind of life we live – peaceful, sad, will now be our own doing. Less danger, more responsibility … We have less time for one another. We use don't [sic] shut ourselves in our apartments and discuss the things we couldn't read in the papers, our antiworld as it were. As the visible world loses its ambiguities, we are growing as boring as we in fact are.[24]

Not only would the pleasure principle suggest that the conflicts and anxieties of an artwork represent an unconscious self-defence mechanism repeating the repressed fears of a given social structure in the present; but the political system can be said here to have ideological repercussions whose unwilled cultural echoes go on being heard long after the fall of its statues, a cultural compulsion to repeat and renarrate those forms of social repression to which one has been habituated. Other forms of government such as representative democracies cultivate different forms of social repression, but the social repression remains, and the point remains – the political system can be said to pervade the psyche of the cultural text.

[21] id., pp.10 – 11
[22] id., p.13
[23] id., p.7
[24] Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia*, (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p.246

Ideology as culturally perpetuated

We have so far moved from visions of art as mirror to the modes of production and the ruling class, to art as complicit self-(mis)recognition, to art as indicative of the compulsive anxieties bred by the manifest psychological ambience of a given political system. The shift is a lessening of degree in the literal political mapping of the ruling ideas of an age onto its cultural productions. In the subsequent models, the emphasis shifts from political imposition to cultural emergence.

A model which ascribes ideological confinement and influence upon art as culturally emergent arises from parts of Barthes' writing. In his preface to the 1970 edition of *Mythologies*, he refers to "the essential enemy (the bourgeois norm)"[25], and in his original 1957 preface he retrospectively explains that his task has been to "to track down, in the decorative display of *what-goes-without-saying*, the ideological abuse which, in my view, is hidden there"[26]. This fundamental suspicion of the "mystification which transforms petit-bourgeois culture into a universal culture"[27], justifies and rewards its own exercise within the context of Barthes' writing. His analysis of *Elle* magazine in the essay 'Novels and Children' purports to expose the ideas of the ruling class – specifically the bourgeois patriarchy – actively reinforcing its ideals of womanhood-as-motherhood even whilst progressively championing women novelists. In the manner by which we are introduced to the women in the *Elle* feature "*Jacqueline Lenoir (two daughters, one novel); Marina Grey (one son, one novel)*"[28] the tally of child production stands both as

[25] Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), p.9
[26] id., p.11
[27] id., p.9
[28] id., p.50

testament to the individual woman's achievement, but also as an integral repudiation of her womanhood. In Barthes' words, it denotes "your freedom is a luxury, is possible only if you first acknowledge the obligations of your nature"[29]. Within the culture endorsed and promulgated by *Elle*'s sexually and socially aspirational readership, the rules of successful womanhood are implicitly clear – if a woman is successful but childless – or even unmarried, one must only smile knowingly as at the accomplished but homosexual actor.

The marketing of 'Soap-powders and Detergents', in the eponymous essay, similarly speaks to class aspirations whilst exploiting the cultural archetype of the dutiful housewife. Barthes notes of the commercial test for effectiveness, "it calls into play vanity, a social concern with appearances, by offering for comparison two objects, one of which is *whiter than* the other"[30]. By assuming, playing on, and thereby reinforcing an aspirational competitiveness, this technique invokes and elicits at its mildest a "keeping up with the Joneses" mentality; or at its more extreme, a sense of the communal observance and social shame encapsulated in the idiom "washing one's dirty linen in public"[31]. Barthes also alludes to the manner by which this mass-produced chemical commodity is fetishised into a luxury by the targeted insistence upon its foaminess.

The distinction to be made between the above two cultural deconstructions and the Althusserian model would be that whereas the above forms of ideological influence prey upon conditioned insecurities in order to sell their goods, and although they both involve a complicit misidentification, Barthes sees their origin as being "the bourgeois

[29] id., p.51
[30] id., p.37
[31] American English: "airing one's dirty linen in public".

norm"[32] and its mythologised universalisation as "naturalness"[33]. Less politically propagated than socially and culturally emergent, the commodities of Barthes' *Mythologies* represent an aspiration to somehow become acceptable by the hypothesised standards of bourgeois culture. This model would therefore be one which regards ideological influences upon art as the manifestation of socio-cultural patterns. To aspire to luxury, to aspire to "progress", to retain patriarchal bonds, to derive pride from cleanliness or motherhood – whatever the social traditions, their ideological influence within the culture is self-medicated, by the market and for the readership and the consumer.

To consider cultural influence upon ideology and thus on art from a deeper origin, we can draw from Lévi-Strauss' *The Structural Study of Myth*. His prognosis that while "Myths are still widely interpreted in conflicting ways: as collective dreams, as the outcome of a kind of esthetic play, or as the basis of ritual … the purpose of myth is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming a contradiction"[34]. Regarding myth as a playing out of social conflicts, we may see them as purely the surviving memes of a selection process of age and memory and thereby detach their longevity from their artistic legitimacy. If we regard myth as representative of those stories which a given tribe or race will co-author and popularise, myths can be taken to be indicative of the endemic ideological tendencies, instinctual fears and social concerns to which a people has for sustained periods been especially susceptible. In this light, future cultural production can be said to be ideologically structured by the folklore and the myth of its ancestors. The individual artist is in sway to the call of the cultural archetypes which resonated with

[32] Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), p.9
[33] id., p.11
[34] Claude Levi-Strauss, 'The Structural Study of Myth', *Critical Theory Since 1965*, ed. Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle, (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1986), pp.810 – 821

mysterious tenacity in the minds of his forebears. As Marx would have it, "The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living"[35].

Ideology from language

At a deeper level than cultural self-prescription and proscription, is founded a model of ideological restriction and construction in art that posits language as the root of ideological structures. In Freud's etymological studies of the word "Heimlich"[36], it is possible to observe an uncomfortable social tension embedded at the level of the signifier – between heimlich as representing all things homely, tame, intimate and friendly[37], and yet also meaning that which is deliberately concealed, duplicitous, secret, hidden from sight[38]. This conflict between privacy as safe and secrecy as disturbing – perhaps stemming from the anxiety surrounding any social stance on intercourse – illuminates the ideological weight of language, as does an example such as "host" which shares a Latin root with the word "hostile". As Terry Eagleton argued from a Marxist position, in language, "shared definitions and regularities of grammar both reflect and help to constitute, a well-ordered political state"[39].

Derrida has shown that Saussure's comments on language can be extended to provide insight into the difficulties of subjectivity and the sign, yet at a more immediate level, Saussure's conception of language has important consequences when applied to

[35] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, quoted here from http://www.uea.ac.uk/~r036/morley.htm
[36] Sigmund Freud, 'The 'Uncanny'', *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey, Vol. XVII, (London: Hogarth Press, 1964), pp.220 – 226.
[37] id., p.222
[38] id., p.223
[39] Terry Eagleton, *William Shakespeare*, (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1986), p.1; quoted here from Peter Barry, *Beginning Theory: an introduction to literary and cultural theory*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p.158

ideology. He writes, "language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system"[40]. Saussure writes of linguistic and conceptual value as issuing from the system, yet if we accept that language determines the very conceptual terms within which we are able to think, it would follow that our thought must be channelled in such a way that, to borrow Saussure's words, "Instead of pre-existing ideas then, we find in all the foregoing examples *values* emanating from the system"[41]. This would tend to encourage our interpretation of reality to conform to the categories we have, indeed it would necessitate expression of our perceptions only within existing terms. Saussure's example is of a street completely rebuilt which can yet "still be the same"[42] because its existence as a named street "does not constitute a purely material entity; it is based on certain conditions that are distinct from the material that fit the conditions, e.g. its location with respect to other streets"[43].

Lacan would argue that these linguistic categories and values become the assumed limits of our universe as language creates an impression through self-referentiality and the obvious silencing of the ineffable, that "there is no language in existence for which there is any question of its inability to cover the whole field of the signified, it being an effect of its existence as a language that it necessarily answers all needs"[44]. To this already hegemonic view of language's ideological influence, Derrida adds the following assertion. He points out that Saussure's position – ""language [which

[40] Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), p.120
[41] id., p.117
[42] id., p.108
[43] id., pp.108 – 109
[44] Jacques Lacan, 'The insistence of the letter in the unconscious', *Modern Criticism and Theory: a reader*, ed. David Lodge, (London: Longman, 1988), p.83

only consists of differences] is not a function of the speaking subject""[45] – implies that "the subject … is inscribed in language, is a "function" of language, becomes a *speaking* subject only by making its speech conform … to the system of the rules of language as a system of differences"[46]. This suggests that in order to gain subjectivity we must first submit to language and that furthermore, the subjectivity of the self arises from the difference between "meant" and "expressed", which the use of language throws up and confronts one with.

Ideology from material development

Having linked a progression of models for the ideological structuring of art from the economically reflective, to the politically constructed, to the culturally and then linguistically emergent, we arrive at a model in which the text of art is limited and structured by the need to ascribe meaning in certain proportions as is determined by material and technological causes. These causes would then be said to underpin the ideas with which art speaks. The material and social consequences of developments of the market can be used to illustrate a shifting ideological permeation – one which assumes differing norms of what humanity is. Michael Novak describes a process at once heralded as liberation and lamented as alienation. He characterises this as "opposite sides of the same experience"[47]:

> The separation of the workplace from the household – although older than capitalism – raised capitalism to a degree of impersonality not possible under agrarian or feudal familism. Under capitalism, a man is not born into his station;

[45] Jacques Derrida, 'Différance', *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p.15
[46] id.
[47] Michael Novak, *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p.44

> questions about his life history became, in a sense, irrelevant. The economic contract does not absorb his entire life. The economic system stands outside the older cultural system. This duality opens up a psychological gap in the life of individuals … Emotionally it brings costs as well as gains. As exchange on the market becomes impersonal, religion, race, and nationality become less relevant. A purchaser of goods or services often does not know the seller or the maker.[48]

In as much as that the culture has shifted into greater impersonality, arguably art must also be bound by an altered assumption about the manner by which it is typical for human beings to interrelate. It follows from Novak's assessment that the practical application of the tenets of free market capitalism, when carried through to their fullest extent, lead to depersonalisation. Given that within this context individuals must still strive to ascribe a meaning to their existence, the emphasis of what is held to be valuable would, I suggest, shift. An example might be that as the technologies of work become increasingly impersonal and competitive, people come to derive more pride from their professionalism than from their parentage; or that less social discourse is given over to personal emotional reflection and response, more to purposive statements of consensus; and in general such a development might lead to less reference to the past and more consciousness of the present.

Benedict Anderson draws an analogy between the co-emergent newspaper and the novel, both of which represent and propound new modes of perceiving time and community. What links the near-simultaneous events of a front page and the cast of characters within a novel is their "presentation of simultaneity within 'the steady onward clocking of homogeneous, empty time'"[49] and also their status as belonging in some significant way to a "community in anonymity"[50]. This permits nationhood to develop as

[48] id.
[49] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (New York: Verso, 1991), p.33
[50] id., p.36

an "imagined community" and to become a tangible bond emerging through print-capitalism in the form of a highly systemised "'meanwhile'"[51].

The material and technological causes of print-capitalism develop into a system with its own undefiable logic: the global market. Late-capitalism and the second globalisation closely mirror the period in which Marx saw that logic of capitalism would drive forward a relentless innovation:

> Constant revolutionising of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions … All fixed, fast-frozen relations with their train of venerable prejudices and opinions are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify … In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes … universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production.[52]

During the relative peace after the Napoleonic Wars, the 19th century saw a vast increase in the quantity of international trade wherein the mass-production enabled by the industrial revolution coincided with an advent of new technologies for communication (of materials, products, ideas) which spread its effects in shockwaves of previously unthinkable reach. The unfurling webs of steamship lines, railways, canals, telegraph lines and telephones[53], with refrigeration prolonging the reach of perishable goods, were reinforced by a simultaneous liberalisation of trade policy throughout Europe, North America, and (usually allied with imperialism as in the Opium Wars) into Asia, including post-isolation Japan[54]. The unrelenting search for new markets is part of the logic of global capitalism which some have argued is structured so deeply around the assumption of growth and innovation that a status quo causes economic stagnation and recession. Regardless of this premise, the creation of "new wants" in place of the old, the creation of

[51] id., p.25
[52] Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, ed. Frederic L. Bender, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), pp.58 – 59
[53] Joshua N. Feinman, 'Globalisation: Déjà Vu?', Institute for Fiduciary Education (IFE), available from http://www.ifecorp.com/Papers-PDFs/Feinman700.pdf, p.2
[54] id.

value by fetishising products and stimulating desire, increasing consumption – in other words, marketing – is a vital and often the largest part of the annual spending of multinational companies.

When Barthes sentimentally romanticises the "familiar and poetic substance"[55] of wooden children's toys which have been superseded by plastic toys, arguably we are not observing a triumph of the ruling ideas of the petit-bourgeoisie. The child brought up with miniaturized operating theatres, hair salons and petrol stations, Barthes writes, "is turned into a little stay-at-home householder who does not even have to invent the mainsprings of adult causality; they are supplied to him ready-made"[56]. Barthes may see children's toys as priming the future consumer for his bourgeois existence, but the values are arguably more precisely those of the market. Values which are championed by the bourgeoisie certainly, but values which arise less from the class subjugation required by a particular mode of production, than by a systematic stimulation of desire. Such an argument would see "new wants" as leveraged around existing class-bound aspirations, yet ultimately driven by a distinct and indefatigable logic.

In Barthes' examples, the mechanics of consumption are reproduced in the developmental phase of childhood by perceived need. The child is sold a red Citroën or an army of soldiers out of a demand created by its supply, which then dissimulates its obviousness: "children play with toy soldiers" becomes, "this country is on the brink of war"; and "Why don't you buy him a toy car to play with", would become "I need an SUV". Barthes writes "the child can only identify himself as owner, as user, never as

[55] Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972), p.54
[56] id.

creator"[57] and he describes the dearth of toys which offer dynamic forms such as wooden blocks[58]. Wooden blocks may offer more creative freedom and may stimulate the child's imagination, but "new wants" could never be so basic, for where imagination and creativity are required by the child, the market can step in to supply a service, a new and better version, an unambiguous product already pre-fetishised in its existing adult size. In this respect, a tendency of mass-market capitalism is to atrophy the improvisational imagination in favour of deliverable product.

Walter Benjamin's essay, *The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction* brings to light those aspects of our conception of ourselves which could be said to have been altered fundamentally by technological changes. The move from stage to screen is one of alienation from the corporal presence of the actor: "The artistic performance of a stage actor is definitely presented to the public by the actor in person; that of the screen actor, however, is presented by a camera"[59]. In consequence, the audience is able "take the position of a critic"[60], to distance itself from "personal contact"[61] with the individual before them and therefore to identify with the camera – as a voyeur, outside the round – rather than with the person. As with cinema, so with television. The proliferation of the screen behind which we may judge and comment from afar without being seen, promotes a voyeuristic and mercantile approach to the performance of others, which can spill over into real life interrelations. If our attention is waning, we may leave the cinema without anybody taking offence, we may change channels instantaneously if the person in front of us is not expressing an opinion we understand; and so in common practice – with leave

[57] id.
[58] id., p.53
[59] Walter Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p.228
[60] id.
[61] id.

taking, with tact and with patience – our behaviour towards others is likely to be altered by the dominant technological modes. Benjamin writes that the approach of the audience becomes that of "testing"[62], and in a footnote, observes how vocational aptitude tests similarly allow the "segmental performances of the individual"[63] to come before the eye of the examiner-as-director. Benjamin describes as symptomatic of "profound changes in apperception"[64], the shift from concentrated contemplation to distracted consideration which is consolidated by the movement of art into the medium of film. We might infer that this attitudinal shift is one now more generally expedited by the ubiquity of fluid visual media. Benjamin quotes Duhamel's protest, "I can no longer think what I want to think. My thoughts have been replaced by moving images"[65]. As the texture of thought changes under the influence of technology, so it must follow that the nature of art will also change.

Conclusion

To conclude, these six models of ideological influence – base, ISA, repression, cultural, linguistic and technological – represent a shift away from the left and away from a conspiracist view of ideological influence. It is possible to decouple the oppressive and sinister connotations from theories of ideological influence, and although this by no means suggests that the model one is left with will be more accurate, it may serve to sustain a more positive outlook upon ideological influence. In terms of art, these forms of

[62] id., p.229
[63] id., p.246
[64] id., p.240
[65] id., p.238

ideological influence circumscribe more complex attributions of the undercurrents of hidden thought than the response "he was … shoring up the ruling class"[66].

Finally, we note that the last model "Ideology from material development" represents in one respect a return to Marx – albeit without the class considerations. If we are to argue that it is shifts in prevailing technology which most profoundly alter our view of ourselves and others, then ultimately we concur with Marx in arguing that "man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence"[67].

[66] 'Marx after communism', *The Economist*, December 21st 2002 – January 3rd 2003, Vol. 365, No.8304, p.19
[67] Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto*, ed. Frederic L. Bender, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), p.73

Bibliography

Althusser, Louis, '"Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses"', *Literary Theory: An Anthology*, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1998)

Anderson, Benedict, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (New York: Verso, 1991)

Barry, Peter, *Beginning Theory: an introduction to literary and cultural theory*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995)

Barthes, Roland, *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1972)

Benjamin, Walter, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, (New York: Schocken Books, 1969)

Boym, Svetlana, *The Future of Nostalgia*, (New York: Basic Books, 2001)

de Saussure, Ferdinand, *Course in General Linguistics*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966)

Derrida, Jacques, 'Différance', *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982)

Feinman, Joshua N., 'Globalisation: Déjà Vu?', Institute for Fiduciary Education (IFE), available from http://www.ifecorp.com/Papers-PDFs/Feinman700.pdf

Foucault, Michel, 'Discipline and Punish', *Literary Theory: An Anthology*, ed. Julie Rivkin and Michael Ryan, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 1998)

Freud, Sigmund, 'The 'Uncanny'', *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, ed. James Strachey, Vol. XVII, (London: Hogarth Press, 1964)

Freud, Sigmund, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, trans. and ed. by James Strachey, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961)

Klein, Naomi, *No Logo: Taking Aim at the Brand Bullies*, (New York: Picador, 2000)

Lacan, Jacques, 'The insistence of the letter in the unconscious', *Modern Criticism and Theory: a reader*, ed. David Lodge, (London: Longman, 1988)

Levi-Strauss, Claude, 'The Structural Study of Myth', *Critical Theory Since 1965*, ed. Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle, (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1986)

'Marx after communism', *The Economist*, December 21st 2002 – January 3rd 2003, Vol. 365, No.8304, pp.17 – 19.

Marx, Karl, *The Communist Manifesto*, ed. Frederic L. Bender, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988)

Novak, Michael, *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982)

Wright, Robert, *Nonzero: The Logic of Human Destiny*, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2000)